Analyze and evaluate the major points of your case study for research to write a

Analyze and evaluate the major points of your case study for research to write an analytical essay.
Use your time to develop a deep understanding of your topic and to fully explain your stance on the
topic using the 7 principles of mission command to appraise the case study assigned. You must
thoroughly discuss no less than 3 of the principles of mission command. You are required to give
an in depth introduction of your topic, including the subtopics you intend to discuss, and develop
the body of the paper fully using no less than 3 full pages and no more than 5 pages, this does not
include the APA format title and references page. Provide a total of 3 references for the references
page. Ensure you use Times New Roman 12 point font and APA 7TH Edition Writing Style Student
Paper format. Break down your essay by MC principle (i.e. each level 1 header is a new MC principle)
o The conclusion paragraph should restate what you discussed in the main body – do not introduce any new thoughts/ideas
Assault River Crossing at Nijmegen, 1944
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
In August 1944, the Allies were pushing toward Germany in attempt
to defeat the Third Reich before winter arrived. Standing between Allied
forces and the German heartland was the Rhine River, which Hitler planned
to use to use as a formidable line of defense. Understanding that crossing
the Rhine would take time and cost many lives, the Allied Command
planned an audacious operation called Market-Garden that would quickly
seize a major bridge over the Rhine in the Netherlands. Once secure, that
bridge, located in the Dutch town of Arnhem, would be used as a gate
through which Allied forces would pour into Germany. Success in this
operation would require surprise and speed. To gain surprise, the Allied
Commanders chose to drop two US Airborne Divisions, the 82d and 101st,
in the Netherlands to seize and secure a series of six bridges along the
road to Arnhem. The bridge over the Rhine itself would be seized by the
British 1st Airborne Division dropped near the town of Arnhem. Once the
Airborne forces were in control of the bridges, the British XXX Corps, a
powerful force composed of mobile armored units, would fight quickly
up the route to relieve the British Paratroopers in Arnhem and secure the
gateway into the Third Reich.
The 82d Airborne Division’s mission was to capture key terrain in
the vicinity of the Dutch cities of Grave and Nijmegen. This included
five bridges, the largest of which spanned the Waal River in Nijmegen.
Because there was a limited number of aircraft available to drop the
paratroopers and tow the gliders, the division’s combat power would land
in the Nijmegen area over a three day period. So MG James Gavin, the
division commander, designated the main Nijmegen Bridge as a priority,
tasking the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) to send a battalion
to seize that bridge as soon as possible on the first day of the operation.
A railroad bridge over the Waal downstream from the main Nijmegen
Bridge was not a priority objective. Two other regiments, the 504th PIR
and 505th PIR, were directed to seize and hold four bridges in the vicinity
of Grave and high ground near the town of Groesbeek on the first day
as well. Glider-borne forces, including artillery and support units, would
follow on the second and third days to help consolidate the gains made by
the paratroop regiments.
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Figure 1. Plan for Market-Garden.
The jumps on the first day, 17 September, went well with little initial
German opposition. Most of the division’s first day objectives were seized
quickly but the main Nijmegen Bridge remained in German hands. An
assault by Company A, 508th PIR had run into staunch German resistance
on the south side of the bridge. Two additional American assaults on the
bridge on Day 2 came within a block of the bridge entrance but were
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ultimately repulsed as the Germans had greatly reinforced their positions.
The problem for MG Gavin and the 82d Airborne was how to secure
the bridge so that the tanks of XXX Corps, rapidly approaching from the
south, could cross the Waal and make their way to Arnhem to relieve the 1st
Airborne that had seized the bridge over the Rhine and were holding on to
it by their fingernails. On Day 2 of Market-Garden, Gavin began thinking
about the tactical problem posed by the strong German positions on the
south side of the bridge but other priorities prevented him from launching
an immediate attempt to seize it. On Day 3 when reconnaissance elements
of XXX Corps made contact with the 82d, Gavin was forced to act and
finalized a wholly new plan that seemed to be the only means of meeting
the intent of the larger operation. Although not equipped with assault
boats, Gavin intended to envelop the German positions on the bridge by
sending two battalions of the 504th PIR across the Waal River in a variety
of civilian watercraft. Once on the north side of the river, the battalion’s
Soldiers would attack and seize the northern end of the Nijmegen Bridge.
At the same time, 2d Battalion, 505th PIR, with support from a British
tank battalion, would attack the southern side of the bridge. Gavin’s hope
was that the simultaneous attacks on both sides would force the Germans
to retreat, leaving the bridge open to the Allies.
When a quick search turned up few civilian boats, British staff officers
in XXX Corps arranged for their engineers to bring assault boats up to
Nijmegen for the crossing but because the boats could not be at Nijmegen
until the afternoon of the next day (Day 4), Gavin unhappily planned for the
assault crossing to begin in the afternoon. To mitigate the risk of a daylight
crossing, he arranged for a great deal of fire support, including mortars,
tanks, artillery, and rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft, targeting the far side of
the Waal River which was defended in strength by German forces. Gavin
briefed the entire plan to the XXX Corps staff and the leaders of the 504th
PIR on the evening of Day 3.
The assault crossing would be led by 3d Battalion, 504th PIR,
commanded by a 27 year old MAJ Julian Cook. Cook had served with the
regiment since Sicily and had rigorously trained his battalion, made up of
hardened veterans, in England before the 504th PIR deployed to Europe.
Once Cook got his rifle companies across and secured a bridgehead on the
north side of the river, the 1st Battalion of the regiment would follow and
secure the western flank. The landing site was approximately two miles
west (down river) from the Nijmegen Bridge. After consolidating on the
northern bank, two of Cook’s companies (H and I) would move east down
the river bank, locate an earthen railroad embankment, and follow that
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north until they hit the road leading from the main Nijmegen Bridge. They
would then turn southeast and assault the north end of the bridge moving
companies abreast, one on either side of the road. Company G would
follow to protect the rear of the two companies in the assault. By early
evening, Gavin hoped to have the bridge in allied possession and the tanks
of XXX Corps rolling across it on their way north to Arnhem.
The realities of the terrain and the enemy’s dispositions posed serious
obstacles to the operation achieving a quick victory. When MAJ Cook first
saw the intended crossing site, he realized for the first time that the river
was 400 yards wide and its current was swift. At that point, the battalion
commander recalled thinking that someone above him had come up with
“a real nightmare.” He then saw that if they succeeded in getting across
this watery expanse, his Paratroopers would then have to cross a flat plain
devoid of cover and concealment and which was 700 hundred yards in
length until they could finally find cover behind a 30 foot high dike. Cook
and his staff officers quickly identified German gun positions along the
northern bank that could sweep the river and plain with machinegun
and cannon fire. Several Dutch stone forts on the north side served as
strongpoints for the German defense of the bridge at Nijmegen and would
have to be attacked if paratroopers were to make it all the way to their
objective. Finally, there was the railroad bridge on the river approximately
1,500 yards to the east of the crossing site. German units had set up 20 mm
gun positions on that structure that could easily fire down on the men of
the 504th PIR as they crossed the river and plain.
Despite his concerns, Cook planned for his forces to consolidate at
the dike and then follow the scheme of maneuver that directed H and I
Companies to assault the north end of the bridge by moving southeast
down the road. All understood that the intent of the division commander
was the seizure of the northern end and the opening of the bridge. In the
early afternoon on the day of the assault, officers briefed their men on the
mission and intent as they waited for the boats to arrive. Many recalled
feeling that the operation was like a Normandy-style landing and that they
had not trained for that type of mission but the Soldiers also understood
that the Nijmegen Bridge had to be taken if the British Paratroopers at
Arnhem were to be relieved.
The 26 boats arrived at the crossing site at 1430, approximately 30
minutes before the close air support would arrive and artillery barrage
would begin. The Soldiers were surprised to find that they were small craft
(19 feet long) with a wood frame and canvas skin. A US Engineer company
had been assigned to operate the boats and found quickly that many of them
were missing paddles. The Engineers went ahead and assembled them,
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after which the units in the first wave – Companies H and I and part of the
battalion HQ – moved to their assigned boats and began loading equipment
and ammunition. To many, it was clear that the boats would have a hard
time making it across the Waal even without the Germans shooting at them
but there was little time to ponder their plight as the artillery began to fire
and the Typhoons arrived to pound the German positions on the far side of
the river. Smoke rounds quickly formed a screen that would provide some
concealment for the Soldiers.
For most of the paratroopers, getting the boats into the water and
moving across the river was a terrifying experience. Despite the smoke
screen, enemy gunners quickly discovered the activities at the launch site
and began firing at the men struggling with the heavy boats. Once on the
water, men paddled with whatever they had to include paddles, rifle butts,
and hands. German machine gun and mortar fire hit many of the boats
during the crossing. The current made some of the boats almost impossible
to steer. MAJ Cook, the battalion commander, led the first wave and
recalled chanting, “Hail Mary, Full of Grace” as he paddled.
Of the 26 boats that left the southern bank, only half made it across
in usable condition. Some did not make it at all. Officers and NCOs
who made it to the north side quickly rallied groups of paratroopers that
were still alive and not severely wounded and began leading them across
the plain through more German fire. The wounded were gathered at a
makeshift aid station. The Engineers began paddling the usable boats back
to the southern side of the river. They would ultimately make several trips
across the river, bringing the remainder of Cook’s battalion over as well as
elements of the 1-504 PIR.
Those in the first wave that made it to the dike quickly organized,
located enemy positions on the dike, and began a ferocious battle for control
of that key terrain. Many Germans surrendered while others had to be
killed with grenades and in brutal hand to hand combat. The chaos during
the river crossing and sprint to the dike had broken up squad, platoon,
and company integrity. The paratroopers at the dike instead formed small
groups and, understanding the mission and intent, had taken control of that
position and begun to consolidate.
The battalion’s disorganization meant that MAJ Cook’s plan to have H
and I Companies attack abreast down the road toward the north end of the
bridge was no longer feasible. Instead, officers and NCOs formed small
groups and moved toward the Nijmegen Bridge, their ultimate objective.
One of Company I’s Soldiers, SGT George Leoleis, recalled the actions of
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his small group, stating, “We were separated from any other men but we
knew in what direction to head for, down the road toward the bridge.” The
commander of Company G found that by late afternoon, the group he led
included Soldiers from companies H and I as well as his own company and
the battalion communications and medical sections. MAJ Cook, and his
operations officer, CPT Keep, quickly put together a group of 30 men and
began moving east from the dike through orchards and down ditches. Keep
recalled that they formed ad hoc squads and used bounding movements
across open areas and from one house to another as they approached the
bridge. By quickly grabbing the initiative in this manner, Keep believed
they were able to keep the German defenders off balance, preventing them
from reorganizing.
1LT Jim Megallas, a platoon leader in Company H, gathered about a
dozen men from his platoon and moved to assault one of the Dutch forts
from which the Germans were using a 20 mm gun to fire at the dike and
at units crossing the river. Megallas’ force concentrated small arms fire on
the fort, suppressing the German gunners. One of Megallas’ NCOs, SGT
Leroy Richmond, then swam the moat surrounding the fort and tried to kill
the Germans inside. Megallas quickly called him off, and remembering
that the bridge was the objective, decided to move his group further east,
leaving the fort for other units to seize.
Figure 2. Assault river crossing at Nijmegen, 20 September 1944.
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Some small groups followed the battalion plan and moved north along
the railroad embankment to the road. There they met a great deal of German
resistance. Another group led by CPT Carl Kappel, the commander of H
Company, reached the embankment and rather than go north according to
the plan, turned south toward the river. They hoped to find a way under
the railroad bridge that would then open up a direct route to the main
Nijmegen Bridge just 1,000 yards away. Kappel’s group was so successful
that it seized the railroad bridge from the Germans. CPT Moffatt Burriss,
the commander of I Company, then took charge of another ad hoc group
gathered at the railroad bridge and began moving east toward the main
bridge. Along the way, they had had to stop and clear a number of buildings
on the banks of the river. Burriss’ group arrived under the main bridge at
the same time that British tanks started crossing the bridge from the south
side where the attack of the 505 PIR had been successful. The paratroopers
from 3-504 went running up steps leading to the road surface above and
met relatively little German resistance. In fact, the Germans defending
the main bridge, threatened by the envelopment from the river crossing,
had begun to pull back to the north away from the bridge. By 1915 that
evening, the intact bridge was in Allied hands.
The fight at Nijmegen had been a success. Part of that victory can
clearly be attributed to MG Gavin’s vision of using an assault river
crossing to envelop the Nijmegen Bridge from two directions but equally
important was the way in which the Soldiers of the 3-504 PIR carried out
the assault.Without their courage, devotion to the mission, and initiative at
individual- and small-unit levels, it is difficult to envision how the crossing
operation could have succeeded. The cost in lives was high. Twenty eight
paratroopers from the 3-504 PIR made the ultimate sacrifice. H Company
lost 15 killed or missing in action and suffered another 38 wounded.
Another 40 of the battalion’s Soldiers were wounded but the actions that
day allowed Allied forces to move toward Arnhem. Although the bridge
over the Rhine did not remain in British hands, XXX Corps was able to
extricate part of the surrounded 1st Airborne Division, saving thousands of
British Soldiers from death or capture.