importance of CSR on the TAPI gas pipeline project and South Sudan oil pipeline. Socio, cultural, economic and security effects in hostile environments:

Researching the importance of CSR on the TAPI gas pipeline project and South Sudan oil pipeline. Socio, cultural, economic and security effects in hostile environments:
A systematic review of the literature. Subject matter expertsUse Social license to operate (SLO), or simply social license, refers to the ongoing acceptance of a company or industry’s standard business practices and operating procedures by its employees, stakeholders, and the general public.
• TAPI gas pipeline Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India
• South Sudan oil pipeline
1. Insurgents do not fight primarily to make money. But international evidence shows that participation in insurgent groups declines when opportunity costs increase – opportunity costs are higher when alternative income-generating opportunities exist or become more profitable.
2. There is strong evidence that violence increases in the context of youth bulges and limited opportunities. Ensuring faster job creation is vital for managing the security risks associated with Afghanistan’s upcoming youth bulge.
3. There is strong evidence that perceptions of exclusion, victimization, and corruption spur violence. Stronger institutions are vital to address these underlying drivers of conflict, especially in relation to the justice sector and management of land and water rights.
4. the link between employment, social cohesion, and peacebuilding and points out the challenges and obstacles of employment promotion in contexts of conflict, fragility and violence
5 employment has proved effective in generating long-term economic opportunities under difficult circumstances
6. minimise the risks to project staff during the lifetime of the projects
7. Social tribal cultural affiliations
While TAPI has considerable potential to open up regional energy pathways and to improve regional connectivity, the underlying security dispensation remains the biggest existential risk to long term successful operation of the pipeline. Though the transit agreements will likely (i) generate considerable state revenues and (ii) contribute to meeting burgeoning energy demand, the truth is that revenues will accrue to central government and gas supplied will likely supply the relatively better off quintiles of society. Given that the pipeline passes over highly contested territory, the CSR framework and Strategy for community stabilization will determine both long-term viability and eventually; profitability too.
The rural populations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain poor, with limited access to basic and essential services; this includes infrastructure and energy supplies. Given the extent of the opium economy, and other combat and coping economies, local community leaders only exist because of their relationship within the patrimonial system. With loyalties ever shifting and the Taliban, ISK and other groups paying rents to local militia, the risks of local fall out leading to attacks on the pipeline are high. The Chinese 30-year concession in Aynak in Logar Province and Hajigak in Wardak Province suffered insurgent attacks, as did the Indian mining concessions in Bamyan Province. The Kabul Ring Road infrastructure was never completed due to disagreements over land and problematic ethnic/tribal groups. The frequent closure of the entire border between Pakistan and Afghanistan demonstrates the volatility in regional territories. With the pipeline planned to reach Gwadar in Pakistan, but with the political situation often against such developments, the building in of a long-term approach to CSR and Stabilization has never been more important.
Securing the pipeline (including its construction) is best achieved not by the costly provision of state army and police, but rather by developing a comprehensive community development approach in pipeline transit communities, to increase the benefits to the local population.
It is suggested to undertake a detailed political economy and asymmetric security assessment up front, in order to develop a community engagement strategy. Although community projects can be funded through the national budget process and through international aid, they can also be developed by introducing viable economic enterprises and jobs within the pipeline footprint. Unless the benefits of pipeline accommodation are built into the overall engagement, a technical solution could be delivered into an unforgiving terrain. Engaging community, religious, insurgent, local governors and representatives, and insurgent groups such as the Talban, Hezbi Islami, Jamiat Islamic, Baloch Separatists (i.e. BLA, BRA, BlF, LEB etc.) will be an indispensable ingredient for success.