Assignment 1 You are the admiral in command of Task Force 61 (TF-61)—Sixth Fleet

Assignment 1
You are the admiral in command of Task Force 61 (TF-61)—Sixth Fleet’s Amphibious Task Force with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). TF-61 has TF-60 (Sixth Fleet’s carrier battle group) in support. You have been issued a warning order (basically a heads-up that you will be ordered to conduct an operation in the near future) from the national command authority (the President via National Security Council via Joint Chiefs of Staff via Central Command (CENTCOM)) to conduct an amphibious assault in the vicinity of Tartus, Syria.
The operation’s missions are to:
• Secure an advanced base (airfields, port facilities, lines of communication, etc.) for follow-on NATO forces, which will be intervening in Syria to conduct combat operations against ISIS.
• Create a safe haven for displaced persons in Syria fleeing violence. Support non-govt agencies/orgs aiding the Syrian displaced persons.
• Gather intelligence on ISIS presence in your area of operations (all of the Syrian coastline plus 200 miles inland).
• Link up with non-ISIS rebel forces and assess their needs for training, equipment, and supplies.
• Engage Syrian govt forces—force their surrender or render them unable to conduct any combat operations.
• Avoid any confrontations with Russian military forces that may result in conflict. However, you are not to allow Russian military forces to interfere with your operations.
Your N-2 (senior naval intelligence officer) and the embarked MEU intelligence (G-2) staffs are developing a working list of intelligence gaps/requirements to be sent ASAP to CENTJIC (CENTCOM’s joint intelligence center) and DIA to be answered. What would some of the intelligence needs or EEIs would you include in this Request for Information (RFI)? Intelligence needs or EEIs are also known as the information requirements needed by the consumer to support decision-making.
Please note you are not tasking collections systems but simply stating the information needs of the mission commander.
Your response length is guided by you. When you think you have answered the assignment’s question, then you are done. Use your imagination to create how the response will look like. Highly recommend you read this week’s lecture notes before doing this assignment–there’s an example of an RFI that you may choose to use in it.
• Your goal is to write 3-4 paragraphs of 4-5 sentences each about the top three points/issues you learned about during the previous week.
• You should put an emphasis in your journal on what was your top takeaway from the previous week’s topics.
1. Intelligence and National Security ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20 The intelligence producer – policy consumer linkage: A theoretical approach Arthur S. Hulnick To cite this article: Arthur S. Hulnick (1986) The intelligence producer – policy consumer linkage: A theoretical approach, Intelligence and National Security, 1:2, 212-233, DOI: 10.1080/02684528608431850 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431850
2. The Intelligence-Policy Nexus
Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers
Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott
3. Working for the “War Czar”
Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking during Crises
Paul D. Miller
4. Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelligence
An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer
Dennis C. Wilder
5. Intelligence Consumers

Introduction

This week examines the role of the consumers of intelligence or the clients of the intelligence community. This is why I have a job as well as everyone else in the IC. There are government officials at all levels of government who need information to make better decisions, faster decisions, and to make their operations more efficient. It is of interest that intelligence consumers are the ones present at both ends of the intelligence cycle. They create the need for intelligence, then consume it.

I would also add that many of you are destined for positions where you will be that consumer. That requirements creator. A policy-maker. A decision-maker. I challenge you now to start thinking about how you will incorporate the intelligence you and your staff will consume into your policy or decision-making process.

Typically, most intelligence professionals engage with their clients, also known as consumers, clients or customers, during several phases of the intelligence cycle including:

• Dissemination
• Feedback/Consumption
• Tasking/Planning

There are many different ways the intelligence producers and consumers communicate:

• In-person meetings & briefings
• Phone calls
• Video teleconferencing
• Email/Text Messaging
• Intelink Web 2.0 tools (chat rooms, discussion groups, etc.) o Secure “iPads” o Intellipedia
• Official correspondence including:
o Letters o Memos
o Messages /”Cables”

o Hardcopy products (estimates, assessments, analysis, etc.)

All of these can occur at multiple classification levels to ensure the security of the information is maintained while being flexible enough to meet the needs of the consumer.

To review, those classification levels are:

• Top Secret
• Secret
• Confidential
• Unclassified//CUI//

To assist in making communications easier, there are a number of dedicated dissemination and tasking/planning systems used by both intelligence producers and consumers. We will look at some of these in detail later on. Remember that most communications occur in a classified manner thus safeguarding what information is discussed or disseminated.

Feedback/Consumption & Planning/Tasking Phases of the Intel Cycle

First, intelligence consumers, for the most part, will establish standing essential elements of information (EEIs) needed by them to accomplish their mission. These are commonly referred to as standing requirements. They are acted upon 24/7 in support of that consumer. Within the Dept. of Defense, standing requirements are captured through Statements of Intelligence Interest (see pgs 1-2), which articulate an organization’s intelligence needs and how they want that intelligence disseminated to them. EEIs can also be called:

• CCIRs: commander’s critical information requests
• PIRs: priority intelligence requirements (check this link out on how to construct PIRs in the US Army)

Second, when crises or other events cause a greater need for intelligence to support an agency or operation, a “request for information or intelligence” (RFI) is utilized. This is the way consumers can submit their adhoc EEIs (Ones they basically had not planned on—think of the US Army and Navy units deploying for hurricane relief operations in Puerto Rico—DOD commands probably did not have standing EEIs for this operation.). Adhoc EEIs go beyond standing requirements or fill in where no standing requirements existed previously. for a second and further explore how consumers communicate their needs. Some organizations will refer to their EEIs, others will use terms such as:

• KIQs: key intelligence questions
• PIRs: priority intelligence requirements
• SINs: standing information needs

Within the DOD Intelligence Analysis Plan (DIAP), the former DOD Intelligence
Production Plan (DODIP), a system called Coliseum is used at all levels of DOD (tactical units to strategic intelligence production centers) to facilitate the creation and moreover, the successful satisfying of RFIs. DHS was attempting to create a similar system called Pantheon, but to my knowledge it has never fully fielded it (…but I could be wrong…). Check this link out for more information on Pantheon.

When an RFI is received by an intelligence production center/organization, production managers are the ones responsible for tasking the right set of intelligence professionals to meet its requirements, overseeing production timelines, and developing the finished product to be delivered to the requestor.

Third, let’s be clear about the nature of a customer’s requirements. They will not be requests for certain intelligence collection disciplines (HUMINT, GEOINT, etc.). The customer typically does not care about the source as long as the finished intelligence product is of value to the decision-making or planning process.

For example, a military commander’s EEIs may look like the following:

• What are the adversary’s intentions in my area of interest (AOI)/area of responsibility (AOR)?
• What forces are available to the adversary to impact my operations?
• What is the terrain in the area? Weather?
• Are there known terrorist groups in my AOI?
• What will be the reaction from the local populace to the presence of my forces in their country?

Another example—a senior Secret Service Agent overseeing security for a National Special Security Event (NSSE) may have the following EEIs:

• What international or domestic terror organizations are present in the NSSE Area of Interest (AOI)?
• What are the intentions of those terror groups present?
• Are there any organizations planning demonstrations to disrupt the NSSE or endanger those participating?
• What is the nature of the weather and terrain in the NSSE’s AOI?

What is a Request for Information?

Most intelligence organizations require intelligence consumers/clients to convey their requirements via formal requests for information (RFI). Systems, such as Coliseum, require RFIs to be filled out in a standard format which include elements to help the intelligence producer to better understand the intelligence need of the consumer. A RFI typically will possess the following elements :

• Name of Requestor: The name may be different from the actual consumer. Most likely a staff member supporting the decision-maker.
• Requestor Contact Information: How can the requester be contacted (phone, email, etc.)
• Suspense Date (LTIOV or “latest time of intelligence value”): When they need the data by. The deadline when it is due by.
• Requirement: What the requestor wants to know in the most specific manner (See EEIs previously discussed).
• Justification: The intent or why the information is needed. Provides understanding of the RFI to the IC.
• Sources Already Consulted: A list of data sources already reviewed; helps to reduce redundancy of efforts and provide insight to why the requirement exists.
• Product Specification: Requested format (oral briefing, written product, graphic/imagery) for information including method of dissemination.
• Product Classification: Key detail impacting dissemination. Remember the requested information may be at a higher or lower classification than the actual request.

Dissemination Phase of the Intel Cycle

Production managers are also heavily involved with the dissemination phase as well—think of them as the portal in which finished intelligence flows out of the production center in response to the RFIs they received. In larger intelligence organizations, there are dedicated dissemination managers overseeing this part of the cycle.

Thanks to the information technology revolution, the IC enjoys a number of dissemination tools and system. The primary revolution in dissemination in the IC has been the Intelink family. Think of Intelink as the classified World Wide Web— Intelink comes in a few “flavors”—top secret, secret and for official use only (FOUO). It changed the way the IC disseminated intelligence to a “push-pull” model. Finished intelligence is still pushed (hardcopy, email, etc.) to consumers, but now they can also access databases and other repositories of intelligence on Intelink and “pull” what they need.

DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (DHS OIA) uses the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to disseminate finished intelligence to internal DHS consumers, state and local law enforcement agencies. HSIN is a CUI-level network that also serves as a collection system-gathering reports from state and local agencies. HSIN is joined by the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), another CUI-level network for sharing information among state and local law enforcement agencies.

Another significant system used at the state and local level is the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), which are administered through US. state police organizations, with the assistance of the US Dept of Justice.

Crisis Management

What does the IC do for its customers during an unforeseen crisis? The analyst agility that Lowenthal talks about and a historical ability to be flexible are some of the ways the IC reacts to support crises.

Typically, a few internal questions will be answered in most agencies affected by the crisis:

1. Who are our experts/SMEs?
2. What are our collection assets that can be brought to bear on the crisis? And what is their status?
3. What finished intelligence do we already possess regarding this crisis?
4. What IC agency is responsible for being the primary agency and needs support?

Within the IC, especially within the Dept. of Defense, there are contingency plans to be implemented in case of a major crisis. Take for example, war on the Korean peninsula. The in-theater commander, US Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command, has organic intelligence assets, but will need assistance. Pacific
Command’s intelligence center, the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), will deploy forward resources (personnel, equipment, collection assets) as needed to Japan and the Republic of Korea. Designated agencies in the IC already have been designated as backups to PACOM’s JIOC including MCIA and DIA, who in turn, will spin up crisis action teams and also forward deploy assets to Hawaii, Japan and Korea as needed by the JIOC.

Depending on the length of the crisis, the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army can tap into its reserve intelligence resources to back up its active duty and civilian intelligence assets. Oh, the Coast Guard too.

As you can imagine, the DOD and the individual services have integrated intelligence into operations planning quite extensively. The Joint Staff’s Joint Pub 2-0 Joint Intelligence states:

“Intelligence should be synchronized with operations and plans in order to provide answers to intelligence requirements in time to influence the decision they are intended to support.”

Customer/Consumer Receptivity

A few scholars who study the relationship between intelligence officers and their customers often refer to the problem of “policymaker receptivity.” Or more simply, does the consumer pay attention to the intelligence provided? Or is the intelligence simply acted upon—even if the action is just thinking about it.

The classic example is the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle of Midway a few months later. Before the Pearl Harbor attack, the senior officers responsible for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, did not pay adequate attention to the strategic warning intelligence they received, in my professional opinion. A few months later, Admiral Nimitz listened very attentively to his intelligence staff about the Japanese plans to attack Midway and the Aleutian Islands. The difference? Nimitz knew he was at war—the ships in Pearl Harbor were still smoking when he flew in to take command. Kimmel and Short were reluctant to make or incapable of making the transition to a war status during a time of prolonged crisis.

But there is, unfortunately, a counter problem. In World War 2, much of German radio traffic was encrypted on the Enigma coding machine, which British intelligence could decipher. The downside was that military commanders sometimes chose not to act on Ultra intelligence because it might give away to the Germans that the Allies had access to Enigma traffic. This has been called the Ultra Syndrome.
For example, during the Battle of Crete in 1941, the Allied commander on the island, New Zealand’s General Freyberg, did not move troops away from defending coastal areas despite Ultra intercepts indicating that a seaborne attack was improbable and an airborne invasion most likely. Freyberg alone had Ultra access, but he did not act on it lest it reveal to the Germans that he knew their intentions. This led ultimately to the fall of Crete.
Another typical example is a National Security Council staffer (1989-90) who stated, “I did not read a single National Intel Estimate (NIE). Not one. CIA

analysts did not have the foggiest notion of what I did, and I did not have a clue as to what they could or should do.”

It is the challenge of the intelligence professional to develop a relationship with their customers to the point when important decisive intelligence is passed, that the consumer pays attention.

Be sure to read the reading assignments on the website this week as they focus on that crucial relationship—the one between intelligence officer/analyst and consumer/client.

Other Aspects of the Consumer to Consider

Any intelligence analyst/officer’s goal is to positively influence the decisionmaking process of their customer or consumer. How do intelligence customers make decisions? Let’s look at a few examples.

Models of Decision Making

Former senior Defense Department leader and Harvard professor Graham
Allison break decision making in a government into three models:

• Rational Actor o Governments are treated as the primary actor. o The government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility, then picks the one that has the highest “payoff.”

• Organizational Process o When faced with a crisis, government leaders don’t look at it as a whole, but break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines.
o Because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all possible courses of action to see which one is most likely to work, leaders settle on the first proposal that adequately addresses the issue.
o Leaders gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty (emphasis on “short-term”). o Organizations follow set “repertoires” and procedures when taking actions.

o Because of the large resources and time required to fully plan and mobilize actions within a large organization (or government), leaders are effectively limited to pre-existing plans.
• Government Politics o A nation’s actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders. o Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background.
o Even if a leader holds absolute power (e.g., the President of the United States is technically the commander-in-chief), the leader must gain a consensus with his underlings or risk having his order misunderstood or, in some cases, ignored. o Related to the above proposition, the make-up of a leader’s entourage will have a large effect on the final decision (i.e., an entourage of “yes men” will create a different outcome than a group of advisors who are willing to voice disagreement). o Leaders have different levels of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and personal ties to decisionmakers.
o If a leader is certain enough, they will not seek input from their advisors, but rather, approval. Likewise, if a leader has already implicitly decided on a particular course of action, an advisor wishing to have influence must work within the framework of the decision the leader has already made. o If a leader fails to reach a consensus with his inner circle (or, at least, the appearance of a consensus), opponents may take advantage of these disagreements. Therefore, effective leaders must create a consensus. o Because of the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and downright disagreements, different leaders may take actions that the group, as a whole, would not approve of.

OODA LOOP

A basic way at looking at how a decision-maker will make a decision maker is the OODA Loop. Created by Colonel John Boyd (USAF) to aid fighter pilots in air-toair combat, the loop is designed to help decision makers assess and analyze their situations faster.

Figure 5.1: OODA Loop.

• Observe – collect current information from as many sources as practically possible.
• Orient – analyze this information and use it to update your current reality.
• Decide – determine a course of action.
• Act – follow through on your decision.

A decision maker continues to cycle through the OODA Loop by observing the results of their actions, seeing whether they have achieved their goals, reviewing and revising their initial decision, and moving to their next action. The purpose of the OODA Loop is to execute it faster than an adversary thus gaining an advantage. Sometimes decision makers refer to this as getting inside the adversary’s OODA Loop. Of note, note the inclusion of “collect current information” in the Observe phase. This is where intelligence plays its part—think of it as where the intelligence cycle intersects the OODA Loop.

Planning, Programming & Budgeting System (PPBS)

On the strategic level, the Dept of Defense started using a Planning, Programming & Budgeting System (PPBS) in the early 1960s to bring order to the very large DOD budget. Long-term, strategic or futures intelligence threat assessments (NIEs, S&T analysis, etc.) feed into the PPBS during its planning stage.

Over the past few years, the ODNI has adopted a version of PPBS, Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) for use in the
ODNI’s management of the National Intelligence Plan (NIP) funding. More on the NIP in Week 13.

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