In a response of 475-550 words, please answer one of the following: (1) In Fed

  In a response of 475-550 words, please answer one of the following:
(1) In Federalist 42, Madison asserts: “To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission.” Do you agree with Madison’s argument that the U.S. Congress under the proposed Constitution should regulate commerce among the several states? Was this not a provision of the New Jersey Plan to rectify a defect in the Articles of Confederation? If the states could impose tolls on goods passing through their territory, what would be the ramifications for commerce in the U.S.? Could this ability to regulate commerce be taken too far? You may wish to consider the implications of the Wickard v. Filburn case, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)? Also, how did the Supreme Court holding in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) narrow the extent of Congress’ regulatory authority that was afforded in the Wickard v. Filburn case?  
(2) Towards the end of Federalist 43, Madison quotes Article I, Section VIII: “’To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.’”  Madison then goes on to state: “The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated. The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc. , established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment.”  Do you agree with Madison that the seat of the federal government (which ultimately would permanently be established in Washington, D.C.) should have been ceded from the existing states and should have remained a federal district so as to protect it from the jealousies and/or neglect of the other states? With that said, as people began moving to the district and the population of the city increased, as residents they were precluded from voting in presidential elections before the passage of Amendment XXIII, “Section I[,] The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section II[,] The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Did the conferral of presidential electors under Amendment XXIII sufficiently provide for the voting rights of D.C. residents or do you agree with the movement now underway to transform Washington, D.C. into a state, thus providing at a minimum two U.S. Senators and one seat in the U.S. House of Representatives for D.C. residents? Does Madison’s belief that the citizens in the federal district (now D.C.) would be represented by the Congress collectively (i.e. the 435 representatives, as well as, the delegates and resident commissioner from the territories) and efficaciously, or do D.C. residents in not having a Congressional delegation for whom they can vote for lead to the grievance on the part of some residents who argue that they, like the American colonists under the British, are subject to “taxation without representation,” which is famously emblazoned on D.C. license plates.
(3) In Federalist 44, Madison writes, “The SIXTH and last class consists of the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest.”  He then goes on to quote from Article I, Section VIII: “’Of these the first is, the “power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.’” Finally, Madison contemplates the ramifications of the necessary and proper clause (which has later been termed the elastic clause given the way in which Congress has over the past two hundred years expanded its powers via this provision) by stating: “Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the provision is improper. But have they considered whether a better form could have been substituted? There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms “necessary and proper”; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.” Do you find Madison’s defense of the necessary and proper clause to be persuasive? When you consider that in addition to Congress’ enumerated powers in the first 17 clauses of Article I, Section VIII, the broad assumption of powers by Congress from clause 18 from Article I, Section VIII (the necessary and proper clause), which has been generally upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court has over the years been to some extent off-set by the assertion of presidential (or executive) powers via the inherent powers of the president derived from broad constitutional statements such as being commander-in-chief and of his or her duty to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States,” in addition to his or her expressed powers (i.e. the specific powers in Article II, Section II (the constitutional powers of the presidency), as well as, powers conferred by Congress (the statutory powers of the presidency). The aforementioned all taking place simultaneously with the assertion of broad and expansive judicial powers by the U.S. Supreme Court since the landmark case, Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Has the growth of federal powers at the expense of state and local powers been a positive development and in keeping with the original understanding of the U.S. Constitution and its scope or does it lend credence to some of the concerns and objections voiced by the Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution?
(4) In Federalist 45, Madison states, “HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.”  Do you agree with Madison’s argument that the federal government under the Constitution would and will not prove fatal to the state governments and their powers? The fears that Madison seeks to allay has proven an ongoing tension between individuals constituting parties and factions in the U.S. over the past two hundred plus years.  The issue violently metastasized and culminated in the U.S. Civil War, with some arguing for the right of state sovereignty or state’s rights. The opening words to Article I, Section X, which were adapted from the Articles of Confederation and incorporated into the U.S. Constitution are: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation[.]” Such a statement, was in the minds of many in the country at the time of the U.S. Civil War, grounds challenging the legitimacy of the Confederacy (the Confederate States of America). In Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address he states: “Plainly the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible. The rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left.” Here Lincoln is arguing that the government should be majoritarian, but constrained “by constitutional checks and limitations[,]” implying that dissenters do not have a right to secede from the Union, but rather that the popular will as it changes over time should govern a nation, bound by constitutional limitations and constraints.  Do you agree with this argument? In Article VI of the Articles of Confederation it states, “No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.” Did the delegates at the Constitutional Convention comply with this provision when they sought permission from their state governments to meet in Philadelphia to consider the exigencies of the Union? Did the subsequent ratification of the Constitution by each state and its concomitant supersession of the Articles adhere to the letter and spirit of that provision in the Articles? Interestingly, in the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, which mirrors the U.S. Constitution almost word for word at times, in Article I, Section X it states: “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation[;]” hence implying the right of a state to secede from that government was also rather dubious despite the authors of that Constitution averring to the supposed fact that their Confederacy was predicated on the rights of each of its constituent states (or state’s rights).
(5) In Federalist 46, Madison writes, “It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States.”  Do you agree with Madison’s assertion that members of Congress will be more apt to concern themselves with local matters than to focus their attention on issues of national concern? Does the expression, “all politics is local,” as articulated by former House Speaker Tip O’Neill hold true in that politicians concern themselves with the interests of their constituents in order to remain in office by winning elections? What does that say about members of Congress seeking earmarks for their districts (also know as “bringing home the bacon”), which were banned for the past decade before being restored? Are earmarks a cost prohibitive or exorbitant waste of taxpayer dollars that generally serve to endear House and Senate members with their constituents as their detractors’ claim, or are they a way of providing valuable services and projects to otherwise neglected districts?
(6) In Federalist 47, Madison states, “If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring “that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT WILL ADMIT; OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY. ” Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department. The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares “that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them. ” This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department.” Madison goes on to cite other states and the intermixture of powers between the different branches of government.  Do you agree with Madison in his departure from an absolute adherence to a separation or disaggregation of powers between the different branches of government and of his allowance for a partial intermixture of powers between the branches in order to yield a system of checks and balances?
(7) In Federalist 48, Madison writes, “What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations. In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory, evidence, I will refer to the example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.” Do you agree with Madison’s belief that parchment barriers, as seen in the various constitutions of the states between their respective branches of government, will prove inadequate in preventing the accumulation of power in a given branch? Consequently, is Madison’s solution of placing the branches of government in tension with each other by affording each with a partial intermixture of powers a sufficient safeguard in ensuring that none of the branches usurp such powers from the others to bring about a tyrannical sway over the rest of the government, and by extension, the people?
(8) In Federalist 49, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) states, “We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy, and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numberous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.”  Do you agree with the author’s argument that the legislative branch (i.e. Congress) was potentially the most dangerous branch in a republican system of government or representative democracy? Consequently, is there any danger in the people rallying to a call from either the executive or judicial departments? Would the people be split between their devotion to a member of Congress who happens to be denizen of their local community or state, or conversely would they be drawn to the rousing pronouncements of a potential demagogue presently in or seeking election to the executive branch?
(9) In Federalist 50, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated.”  Do you agree with the author that the prospect of a censorial revision of an action of Congress, “ten fifteen, or twenty years[,]” after the “hundred to two hundred members” indefatigably and unrestrainedly focused on an endeavor that is outside constitutional bounds, would serve as little deterrence in such a body undertaking the said enterprise? When something has been established in law in what in judicial parlance is tantamount to a precedent, is it easily overturned?
(10) In Federalist 51, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.” Do you agree with the author that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” and that auxiliary precautions should be employed? The author goes on to state that the Congress should be divided into two branches such that they be rendered “by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.” With that said, does Amendment XVII, which calls for the direct election of U.S. Senators by the people of their respective state instead of being chosen by that state’s legislators comport with the author’s belief that the House and Senate should be fundamentally different from each other in order for them to provide a mutual check on each other’s powers? Consequently, does the coalescence in the electoral procedures governing the elections of House and Senate members undermine the author’s insistence that the two bodies be sufficiently differentiated from each other in order to prevent their mutual aggrandizement of power?
(11) In Federalist 52, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) states, “FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution. The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.” Do you agree with the author that the qualifications governing electors (i.e. voters) in each state for choosing their state legislators should govern the electors (i.e. voters) of members of the U.S. House of Representatives from that state? Does the author concede or simply ignore the fact that such a concession necessarily implies that if a state had a property holding requirement for voting in elections and for running for office, then those that were landless would be precluded at the very least from voting? Since New Jersey allowed women to vote from 1776 to 1807, was the ambiguity in the U.S. Constitution actually advantageous for women in that state? Interestingly, Article IV of New Jersey’s 1776 Constitution states: “4. That all Inhabitants of this Colony of full Age, who are worth Fifty Pounds proclamation Money clear Estate in the same, & have resided within the County in which they claim a Vote for twelve Months immediately preceding the Election, shall be entitled to vote for Representatives in Council & Assembly; and also for all other publick Officers that shall be elected by the People of the County at Large.” Not only did this allow for women to vote in New Jersey during the aforementioned years, African Americans were theoretically allowed to vote until 1797 when the New Jersey government changed the voting requirements such that only free inhabitants could vote. Records are scarce from the time and given the monetary valuation of the given inhabitant, it is somewhat doubtful that many, if any, African Americans in New Jersey would have been eligible to vote.  With that said, it is nonetheless intriguing to consider that given the ambiguity in the law, African Americans, both men and women, would have technically been eligible should they have met the asset holding requirement.  Unfortunately, in 1807, the New Jersey legislature followed in the pattern of the other states by limiting the franchise to tax-paying white males, thereby precluding women from voting as well.
(12) At the end of Federalist 53, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.” Do you find the author’s aversion to annual elections warrantable given the fact that those individuals elected to the legislature illegitimately would not be expelled from the chamber before much of the year had elapsed? Do biennial elections allow for members of the House of Representatives to focus on legislating for a time rather than to interminably be focused on election campaigns? When you consider that the California State Assembly under the 1849 Constitution originally had annual elections, did the subsequent change to biennial elections like the U.S. House of Representatives improve the efficacy of that body or, on the other hand, did it lead to less responsiveness on the part of the Assembly members to the wishes of their constituents (i.e. voters)?
(13) In Federalist 54, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) states, “THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. “We subscribe to the doctrine,” might one of our Southern brethren observe, “that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property.” It is hard to say whether Hamilton or Madison is the author of Federalist 54. With that said, it is interesting to note that the duality of the census being used to determine both representation for a given state in the U.S. House of Representatives and also the taxes required from that state, led to rather contradictory views of the subject being taken by Northern and Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention.  Northern delegates, according to the author of Federalist 54, and as found in Madison’s Notes concerning the Constitutional Convention, seemed to want to count slaves for the purpose of taxation as only implying their ascription as property in the minds of those delegates.  Perhaps the Northern delegates in outnumbering the Southern delegates felt that counting slaves as persons for the purpose of ascertaining the number of House seats a state would be entitled to after the decennial census would empower the Southern states and perpetuate what they perceived as the national evil embodied in slavery or human bondage. The author of Federalist 54, who embraced the views of the Southern delegates instead wished to count slaves also as persons for the purpose of representation in the House.  Such a position was by no means altruistic, but was in many respects self-serving in that in counting slaves as full persons, the South would be entitled to a larger Congressional delegation in the House of Representatives.  Consequently, to reach an agreement, the Northern and Southern delegates compromised by counting slaves as three-fifths of a person, a reprehensible blight on the Constitution that emerged. As unenlightened as the views of the author of Federalist 54, appear, they interestingly, and also regrettably appear preferable when juxtaposed to the decision rendered in the Dred Scott v. Sandford case, 60 U.S. (19. How) 393 (1857), wherein slaves were not considered citizens or persons, but were merely considered property. In the Confederate Constitution that followed a few years after the Dred Scott decision, the close approximation of the wording of that document when compared to the U.S. Constitution breaks down at times, such that all references to “all other persons” was substituted with the expression “all slaves.” With that said, does that in someway cast a more positive light on the authors of the U.S. Constitution in that they chose to substitute a more euphemistically acceptable expression for the national blight of slavery, whereas the South was simply more blunt and apparently did not wish to concede any ambiguity in the allowance of that government for the baneful and pernicious practice of devaluing and dehumanizing fellow human beings?
(14) In Federalist 55, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would, at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” Do you agree with the author of Federalist 55 in that there is a happy medium if you will in terms of a legislature’s size such that the body functions efficaciously, whereas when the body is too small, or on the other hand, too large (as was the case in Athens with 6,000 or 7,000 in attendance), then despite how wise and sagacious the delegates or representatives are (even if they were as gifted as Socrates), the meetings of that body would descend into moblike behavior (or as the Greek’s would term gatherings of the “hoi polloi” (οἱ πολλοί))? Do you feel the present size of the U.S. House of Representatives as capped at 435 members plus non-voting delegates from the territories, a resident commissioner from Puerto Rico, and a delegate from the District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.) by the 1929 Permanent Apportionment Act resulted in that body functioning most efficiently, or would capping the body at a different number of representatives be more appropriate?
(15) In Federalist 56, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities. It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.” Does the author in alluding to the fact that the First Congress would be extremely small in terms of members, roughly 65, present a solid case that the chamber would operate effectively? While he writes Federalist 56 before a fixed number of House seats is decided by elections, does his argument that “the objects of federal legislation[:] commerce, taxation, and the militia[,]” represent the issues that you would have thought would have been of utmost importance at that time? Does his enumeration of the issues of concern seem to imply that the House originally would have been quite limited or circumscribed in the scope of its powers and hence, regulatory authority?
(16) In Federalist 57, the author (either Hamilton or Madison) argues, “THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government. The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people. Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the House of Representatives that violates the principles of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens? Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State. Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination of the people. If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents. In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements. In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.” Do you agree with the author of Federalist 57 in that the House, at least originally, was unlikely to be made up of what critics claimed would be an oligarchy? Would the individuals elected to office come from all walks of life since there would be “[n]o qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession[.]” Consequently, would, as the author claims, the representatives in Congress manifest “fidelity to their constituents[?]” Has this consistently been the case over the past two hundred plus years, or has the increasing cost of running a successful campaign rendered it such that the average citizen simply is not in a position to run for the House of Representatives with any reasonable assurance of victory?
(17) In Federalist 58, Madison states, “The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of