magine a post-conflict peacekeeping operation on the Korean Peninsula. Given you

magine a post-conflict peacekeeping operation on the Korean Peninsula. Given your readings from Week 8, what would be important theoretical and operational approaches for a successful operation? What approaches might lead to failure (given your knowledge of other UN peacekeeping mission disasters)?
I look forward to reading your posts and providing feedback on the discussion
readingOne point from last week’s discussion that bears repeating is the importance of national power in international conflict resolution efforts. When examining an approach that’s typically multilateral, such as peacekeeping, it’s easy to emphasize the role of global institutions such as the UN, or regional military alliances like NATO. As such institutions have broadened the concept of peacekeeping during the post-Cold War era, emphasizing humanitarian objectives and various elements of nation-building, it’s fairly common for pivotal states to take lead roles in the crafting and execution of peacekeeping mandates. When pivotal states are also regional powers, as was the case with Russia’s involvement in Georgia in 2008, that regional power’s interests go a long way towards determining what the international community can realistically accomplish.
Remember too that a liberal-democratic philosophy underpins much of post-Cold War peacekeeping, but some important members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, only partially endorse this philosophy, at best. What emerges from such diverging perspectives is a pervasive tension between post-Westphalians who’re working slowly and inexorably towards some form of global society, and those firmly rooted in the Westphalian worldview that places a premium on national sovereignty and national interests.
The nation-state is alive and well in the post-9/11 world, despite reports of its demise after the Cold War concluded. The credit for failures and successes of multilateral conflict resolution efforts properly resides with the countries that make up the international community. Thus, the demise of the old League of Nations was really a failure of the British and French foreign policy of appeasement, and the UN similarly is a forum where its member-states interact. Where powerful states perceive their national interests are at stake, substantive global action is more likely. It’s rare indeed for such a power to act in an altruistic fashion absent such national interests; the US did so in Somalia, but is unlikely to do so again any time soon.
Substantive action does not guarantee success, of course, because many of the situations post-Cold War peacekeepers find themselves in are messy, intrastate affairs with no easy solutions. Ultimately, I think one’s view of what peacekeeping can accomplish in the future is dictated by his or her worldview, whether it be informed by some form of realism, liberalism, a clash of civilizations, or something else entirely. There are no right answers here, but I hope this course has helped you to think about some of these major issues that affect world we live in, and the next generation will inherit.
A liberal-democratic philosophy underpins much of post-Cold War peacekeeping, but some important members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, only partially endorse this philosophy. What emerges from such diverging perspectives is a pervasive tension between post-Westphalians who are working slowly and inexorably towards some form of global society, and those firmly rooted in the Westphalian worldview that places a premium on national sovereignty and national interests.