G‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‍‍‌‍‍uidelines: You should critically assess the various argumen

G‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‍‍‌‍‍uidelines: You should critically assess the various arguments you encounter by (1) stating as clearly as possible the positions and objections and explaining unfamiliar or technical concepts, and (2) defending your own view through reasoned argument. Essays will be evaluated on the basis of the following: 1. Research: For most topics you should use resources beyond those assigned in class, e.g. a “target” reading and at least 2 or 3 commentaries or response papers (you will find many suggestions below). You must only use peer-reviewed, scholarly, sources, such as THE ONES LISTED IN THE TOPICS BELOW. Google scholar is helpful for finding additional reputable sources. For general overviews see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. DO NOT RELY ON WIKIPEDIA!!! 2. Writing: Write intelligibly. This includes everything from spelling and grammar, to structure and style. You must have a POLISHED introductory paragraph which (a) introduces your topic (subject, authors to be discussed, problem to be tackled, description of organization/plan) and (b) a THESIS STATEMENT which summarizes your conclusions. You must include a bibliography. You must support your assertions with SHORT direct quotations (appropriately cited). Either APA or MLA styles are acceptable for formatting. 3. Argument: (i) State as clearly as possible the problem or issue to be discussed, how it arises, and why it is important. Puzzles, dilemmas, and thought experiments can introduce a topic, as well as help advance a particular argument (ii) clearly and concisely present some alternative explanations or approaches that are available; carefully identify the various positions and arguments of other authors, including specific premises, “hidden assumptions,” and conclusions (iii) make sure that you explain assumptions, unfamiliar technical concepts, principles, and academic jargon in your own words (iv) give short quotations to support your claims (v) critically assess the arguments by (1) using whatever (conceptual or empirical) evidence is available to evaluate the differing alternatives (2) drawing attention to points that seem controversial, or just hard to understand (3) considering possible objections to the premises and hidden assumptions (4) explaining whether conclusions follow from their premises, and (5) acknowledging other points of view. On the basis of the evidence for the different alternatives, make a compelling case for the answer you prefer. Argue for what you see as the best answer to your question (you may or may not agree with me or the authors you discuss). 4. Conclusion: Finally, summarize the results of your discussion. What conclusion(s) have you reached? Are there any surprising consequences for your analysis? What further issues or difficulties does your answer raise? . Essays will be graded on the quality of your argument, not on any particular conclusion you might reach. TOPICS Write a 10-12-page paper on one of the following topics: 1. How does Taylor use Leibniz’s Law to refute Materialism in “Materialism and Personal Identity”? Compare and contrast Taylor’s argument to Descartes’ argument for Dualism in Meditation VI. Given what Smart says in his reply to “objection 1,” how would he respond to Taylor? Why does Smart think that Identity Theory is superior to Dualism? Who do you think is right and why? Is the mind physical or non-physical? (Additional reading: Taylor, R. (1983). Metaphysics. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.) 2. Explain the motivation behind Ryle’s rejection of the Cartesian conception of mind, showing how he is led to develop a non-Dualistic alternative – . Behaviorism. Explain why Ryle says that he is neither a Dualist nor a Materialist. What advantages does Logical Behaviorism have as compared to Cartesian Dualism? What are its drawbacks? (Ryle and Graham and Cooney will be helpful to for this topic.) 3. How does Ryle use the Problem of Other Minds to attack Cartesian Dualism? Is he successful? Explain why or why not. Describe and evaluate at least two solutions to the Problem of Other Minds (Ryle and Graham will be useful here). 4. Will everyday mental categories, such as “belief,” “desire,” “representation,” and “consciousness” suffer the same fate as failed scientific concepts and theories, such as “caloric”? Clarify, motivate, and assess the proposal that everyday “folk” categories of the mental are good candidates for eventual elimination and replacement by a mature neuroscience. What arguments does Paul Churchland give in “Eliminativism and the Propositional Attitudes?” to sustain this thesis? Critically examine Eliminativism in light of Horgan & Woodward’s “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay” or Greenwood “Against Eliminative Materialism” (see philpapers for complete references. Section of contains further bibliographic references that you may wish to consult). 5. Is eliminativism self-defeating? Consider the objection from the perspective of Churchland at the end of “Eliminativism and the Propositional Attitudes?” How does Churchland utilize an analogy to vitalism and what exactly is his reply to the objection? Does it matter that neuroscience does not currently offer an alternative to folk-psychology. Compare Churchland’s response to Graham’s version of the objection () that “absent aboutness no counter counters.” How did I suggest (in the lecture notes on intentionality) that Graham’s view might be confusing the metaphysical with the epistemological? Finally, look up Slagle (2020) “Yes, Eliminative Materialism is Self-Defeating” Phil. Inv. 43(3). Why does Slagle think that eliminativism is self-defeating, after all. What do you think? 6. Discuss the problems of liberalism and chauvinism for the Functionalist theory. Start by explaining functionalism: What is a causal role? How is it a “modest” theory of mind? What motivates it? Then work through Block’s paper: “Troubles with Functionalism.” What varieties of functionalism are there, and how do they fare with respect to liberalism and chauvinism? 7. Is there is a difference between real and merely “as-if” intentionality? If so, what is the difference? Compare and contrast Graham and Searle (in Cooney) with Dennett in “The Myth of Original Intentionality” and “True Believers.” Does Watson (the Jeopardy playing computer) have beliefs? 8. What is the problem of intentionality for naturalism? Motivate and explain Dretske’s account of how a physical symbol can come to mean something in “If you can’t make one, you don’t know how it works.” Explain why he says that any adequate theory of content can’t be merely be a 4. Will everyday mental categories, such as “belief,” “desire,” “representation,” and “consciousness” suffer the same fat‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‍‍‌‍‍e as failed scientific concepts and theories, such as “caloric”? Clarify, motivate, and assess the proposal that everyday “folk” categories of the mental are good candidates for eventual elimination and replacement by a mature neuroscience. What arguments does Paul Churchland give in “Eliminativism and the Propositional Attitudes?” to sustain this thesis? Critically examine Eliminativism in light of Horgan & Woodward’s “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay” or Greenwood “Against Eliminative Materialism” (see philpapers for complete references. Section of contains further bibliographic references that you may wish to consult). 5. Is eliminativism self-defeating? Consider the objection from the perspective of Churchland at the end of “Eliminativism and the Propositional Attitudes?” How does Churchland utilize an analogy to vitalism and what exactly is his reply to the objection? Does it matter that neuroscience does not currently offer an alternative to folk-psychology. Compare Churchland’s response to Graham’s version of the objection () that “absent aboutness no counter counters.” How did I suggest (in the lecture notes on intentionality) that Graham’s view might be confusing the metaphysical with the epistemological? Finally, look up Slagle (2020) “Yes, Eliminative Materialism is Self-Defeating” Phil. Inv. 43(3). Why does Slagle think that eliminativism is self-defeating, after all. What do you think? 6. Discuss the problems of liberalism and chauvinism for the Functionalist theory. Start by explaining functionalism: What is a causal role? How is it a “modest” theory of mind? What motivates it? Then work through Block’s paper: “Troubles with Functionalism.” What varieties of functionalism are there, and how do they fare with respect to liberalism and chauvinism? 7. Is there is a difference between real and merely “as-if” intentionality? If so, what is the difference? Compare and contrast Graham and Searle (in Cooney) with Dennett in “The Myth of Original Intentionality” and “True Believers.” Does Watson (the Jeopardy playing computer) have beliefs? 8. What is the problem of intentionality for naturalism? Motivate and explain Dretske’s account of how a physical symbol can come to mean something in “If you can’t make one, you don’t know how it works.” Explain why he says that any adequate theory of content can’t be merely be a recipe for “making candy from candy.” Carefully evaluate his argument, explaining each step, such as the importance of “natural indicator systems.” What is the Causal Theory and why is the Disjunction Problem important? Does Dretske succeed in showing how the distinctive features of intentionality mentioned by Graham can be naturalized? What is the most important objection to this theory by your own lights? Can intentionality be explained naturalistically? Further resources: see Chisholm for background (in Cooney); see Kim’s Philosophy of Mind: An introduction or Bradden-Mitchell and Jackson’s Philosophy of Mind and Cognition for excellent overviews of the Dretske-type view. A full explication of Dretske’s theory is presented in his Explaining Behavior. Dretske and his Critics by McLaughlin (ed.) contains useful criticism (see Horgan’s essay for example). The anthology Meaning in Mind also contains several useful essays on the causal theory of meaning. 9. Dretske’s Naturalization of Intentionality: motivate and explain Dretske’s account as to how a physical symbol can come to mean something in “If you can’t make one, you don’t know how it works.” Explain why he says that any adequate theory of content can’t be merely be a recipe for “making candy from candy.” Carefully evaluate his argument. Does Dretske show that there are natural systems which possess the distinctive features of intentionality mentioned by Graham? What is the most important objection to this theory by your own lights? Can intentionality be explained naturalistically? What would Churchland say? For further resources see Kim, Philosophy of Mind: An introduction and Bradden-Mitchell and Jackson Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (each contain excellent overviews of the Dretske-type view). A full explication of Dretske’s theory is presented in his Explaining Behavior. Dretske and his Critics by McLaughlin (ed.) also contains useful criticism (see Horgan’s essay for example), and anthology Meaning in Mind contains several useful essays on the causal theory of meaning. 10. Is there something about Mary? Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” 567-70; Van Gulick, “Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?” Part I, ; Churchland, “Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson” 571-78; Lewis, “What Experience Teaches,” 579-96, in Block et al. The Nature of Consciousness. 11. What is the phenomenal concepts approach to consciousness, and what problem is it a response to? Reading: Loar “phenomenal states” (in Cooney). See also Carruthers & Veillet “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy” for further discussion and criticism. 12. Epiphenomenalism: In the last chapter of Graham’s book Philosophy of Mind (“Fear and Trembling”) he considers the “Master Argument” for epiphenomenalism. Why does Graham think that evidence from psychopathology help defeat the Master Argument? How does his view compare to EITHER Jackson’s view in “Epiphenomenal Qualia” or Flanagan’s view in “Conscious inessentialism and the epiphenomenalist suspicion”? Would your secondary author agree or disagree with Graham? What do you think: is epiphenomenalism plausible? References: Graham, G. (2000). Philosophy of Mind: An introduction. (Chapter 11) Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Inc. Flanagan, O. (1997). “Conscious inessentialism and the epiphenomenalist suspicion.” In Flanagan Consciousness Reconsidered in Block et al. The Nature of Consciousness. Jackson, F. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” In Brian Cooney (ed.) The place of mind. Wadsworth. 13. Like the song says: WHERE IS MY MIND? Strawson writes: “if I had to say where I thought ordinary experience imagines the I or self to be, I’d say ‘Two or three inches behind the eyes, and maybe up a bit,” (“The self and the SESMET,” ). In what sense does conscious introspection seem to present (or perhaps not present) the mind as having a physical character (. in Descartes’ sense of extension). See the section Consciousness and Space of “Mysterianism” by Rowlands, The Blackwell companion to consciousness (eds.) Velmans and Schneider. Do your introspective judgments agree or disagree? You might also consider how this relates to Aristotle’s view (shared with the Stoics and others) that the mind is located in the heart (see Ancient theories of the soul, SEP; . Gross (1995). “Aristo‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‍‍‌‍‍‍‍‌‍‍tle on the brain,” Neuroscientis 1:245:50; Frampton (1991). “Aristotle’s cardiocentric model,” Journal of the history of biology 24(2): 291-330. . You MUST clear it with me before you attempt a topic not on this list – no exceptions